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Editors’ Summary
THE BROOKINGS PANEL ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY held its eighty-
eighth conference in Washington, D.C., on September 10 and 11, 2009.
All of the papers were related in some way to the remarkable macro-
economic developments of the past two years: the papers considered the
zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, consumer ﬁnancial regulation,
unconventional monetary policy, the macroeconomic consequences of ﬁs-
cal stimulus, and monetary and ﬁscal policy in the Great Depression. This
issue of the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity presents the papers
from the conference, comments by the formal discussants, and summaries
of the discussions of the papers by conference participants.
IN THE FIRST PAPER, John Williams investigates the implications of the
fact that monetary policy cannot push nominal interest rates below zero.
An earlier literature studied this issue in light of the Bank of Japan’s
experience with near-zero rates beginning in the mid-1990s and the
Federal Reserve’s experience with very low rates in 2003 and 2004.
That literature concluded that although the zero lower bound was likely
to be a binding constraint relatively frequently, its average economic
cost was likely to be small. Williams reexamines this conclusion in light
of the recent crisis, during which most major central banks pushed inter-
est rates close to zero.
Williams’s ﬁrst ﬁnding is that the zero lower bound is imposing very
large costs in the current episode. He reports that although the downturn
would have been almost as severe in the absence of the zero bound, the
recovery would have been much faster. He estimates that an uncon-
strained Federal Reserve would have cut its federal funds rate target by
about an additional 400 basis points, and that those cuts would have
raised output over the next four years by a cumulative $1.8 trillion. More-
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of the Federal Reserve’s inﬂation objective.
Looking forward, Williams considers the possibility that the recent sharp
recession might signal a return to the greater macroeconomic volatility expe-
rienced in the 1960s and 1970s. Such a change would greatly increase the
probability that the zero bound would become a binding constraint with a
low target rate of inﬂation, fundamentally altering the case for a low target.
For instance, Williams ﬁnds that a 1 percent annual inﬂation target would
very likely be associated with frequent and costly encounters with the zero
bound. A 2 percent target would also likely involve large costs if policy-
makers follow a conventional interest rate rule; however, these costs could
be mitigated substantially if policymakers followed alternative monetary
policy rules or used countercyclical ﬁscal policy more aggressively. Only
when the inﬂation target is set as high as 4 percent can policymakers be con-
ﬁdent that the zero lower bound will not prevent them from forcefully coun-
tering recessions. This is an important and provocative ﬁnding in light of the
current debate around the optimal inﬂation target for the United States.
IN THE SECOND PAPER, Sumit Agarwal, John Driscoll, Xavier Gabaix, and
David Laibson mount a compelling case that many individuals, particu-
larly older ones, often make poor ﬁnancial choices. The authors investigate
patterns of errors in personal ﬁnancial decisionmaking across several
large-scale databases. A particular strength of these datasets is that they
allow the authors to demonstrate quite convincingly that errors in ﬁnancial
decisionmaking are both widespread and quite costly. The ﬁnancial mis-
takes they consider include suboptimal use of offers of low interest rates
on transfers of credit card balances, misestimation of housing values, and
tolerance of excessive interest rates and fee payments. Across a wide range
of ﬁnancial decisions, the authors ﬁnd that the tendency to make these
errors initially declines with age, then ﬂattens during the middle years, and
ﬁnally rises increasingly steeply during old age. The “age of reason”—the
trough of this U-shaped pattern—occurs when people are in their early
ﬁfties. This nonlinear pattern likely reﬂects the offsetting inﬂuences of
ﬁnancial experience (which rises with age) and cognitive ability (which
generally declines with age). Financial errors by older persons are a partic-
ular source of concern because the stakes are often large—personal net
worth is typically highest in old age—and the horizon to recover from
errors is often limited.
The authors then turn to an assessment of the regulatory implications
of these ﬁndings, structured around a taxonomy of alternative regulatory
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adults, much of the discussion is relevant for all vulnerable populations. In
rough order from least to most interventionist, the regimes are laissez-
faire, disclosure requirements, “nudges” (through choices of defaults, for
example), expanded use of advance directives (instructions set out today
against a future loss of competency), requirements for ﬁnancial “driver’s
licenses” (where individuals must establish competency to be allowed to
make certain ﬁnancial decisions), enhanced requirements for ﬁduciaries,
protection of assets through sequestration in safe investments, ex post pro-
hibition of ﬁnancial products found to be deleterious, and mandatory
preapproval of ﬁnancial products by regulators. This taxonomy provides a
useful framework to guide regulatory change, although the authors con-
clude that a clear roadmap for appropriate regulation awaits further empir-
ical evidence on how consumers actually make ﬁnancial decisions. Given
the importance of the issues, much more research on household ﬁnance is
clearly needed.
STANDARD TEXTBOOK ACCOUNTS OF monetary policy describe the role of
the central bank primarily in terms of its control of short-term interest rates
(in the United States, the federal funds rate). Yet over the past two years
the Federal Reserve and other central banks have deployed a whole host of
alternative policy instruments, broadly described as “unconventional mon-
etary policy.” In the third paper, Ricardo Reis examines the Federal
Reserve’s use of these instruments. 
Reis’s focus is on the most novel of the new instruments: direct inter-
ventions in credit markets. To analyze these, Reis builds a theoretical
model describing the interactions among four types of ﬁnancial actors in
addition to the central bank: investors, who have funds to lend but no spe-
cialized ﬁnancial knowledge or skills; traders, who have a specialized abil-
ity to evaluate ﬁnancial instruments; lenders, who have a specialized
ability to evaluate investment projects; and entrepreneurs, who seek to bor-
row to undertake investment projects. This approach gives a central role to
imperfect and incomplete information in explaining ﬁnancial market trans-
actions. These market imperfections not only result in departures from
ﬁrst-best outcomes, but in some circumstances can even lead to a collapse
of normal ﬁnancial ﬂows.
Reis then examines the Federal Reserve’s recent interventions through
the lens of his model. He ﬁnds that their impacts often depend on the
details of the interventions, on market conditions, and on the skills or
authority the central bank has that other market participants do not. He also
EDITORS’ SUMMARY ix
11941-00b_Summary-rev.qxd  1/26/10  11:09 AM  Page ixﬁnds that in many circumstances loans to traders are a particularly effec-
tive form of intervention. 
The paper then turns to the Federal Reserve’s other instruments. Reis
explains why standard concerns about the possibility of insolvency that
apply to ﬁrms or governments do not apply to the central bank when it
increases its liabilities by expanding the quantity of reserves. He also
argues that the expansion of reserves will lead to inﬂation only if the Fed-
eral Reserve becomes unduly concerned about the state of its balance
sheet, or if deterioration of the balance sheet results in the Federal Reserve
losing its independence. Turning to the question of appropriate interest rate
policy in the vicinity of the zero lower bound, Reis concludes that the
Federal Reserve has followed the precrisis recommendations of many
economists—committing to a spell of low interest rates and raising
expected inﬂation—only to a very small extent.
ANOTHER DRAMATIC CHANGE IN the policy regime that has resulted from
the crisis concerns the role of ﬁscal policy. Before the crisis, there was
broad consensus that monetary policy should be the prime tool of stabi-
lization policy. But with conventional interest rate policy constrained by
the zero lower bound, many countries have turned to ﬁscal policy to stim-
ulate their economies.
In the fourth paper, Robert Hall examines one such ﬁscal tool: increases in
government purchases. The title of his paper poses his central question: By
how much does GDP rise if the government buys more output? Hall begins
with an empirical exploration, focusing on aggregate U.S. data since 1930.
His ﬁrst conclusion is that government purchases have varied so little in the
period since the Korean War that any test based on data from that period is
almost certain to be uninformative. It is only the sharp shocks to government
spending resulting from the Korean War and, especially, World War II that
allow the correlation between increases in government purchases and
increases in GDP to be estimated with any precision. Over his full sample,
Hall ﬁnds that each dollar of increased government purchases is associated
with an increase in real GDP of about 50 cents. Unfortunately for econome-
tricians, government spending during those wars was not increased in isola-
tion: both also featured major tax increases and (especially World War II) the
use of command-and-control measures. Thus, no ﬁrm conclusions can be
drawn from these episodes, although one can make a case that they provide
likely lower bounds on the effects of increases in government purchases.
Hall then turns to theory. Again, his ﬁrst result is negative: he estab-
lishes that a baseline real business cycle model cannot deliver any substan-
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ﬁnds that two ingredients are critical to generating such an effect. The ﬁrst
is some force causing ﬁrms’ markups of price over marginal cost to fall
when output expands, leading to the possibility of a procyclical real wage.
The second is a force causing modest increases in the real wage to bring
forth substantial increases in the quantity of labor. Hall argues that such a
response cannot plausibly occur if households are on their labor supply
curves, but can arise if there are labor market and search frictions. He also
argues that a third ingredient, complementarity between hours and con-
sumption, is needed for consumption to rise. Adding these features to a
calibrated model leads him to conclude that output rises slightly less than
one for one with government purchases under normal economic circum-
stances. Importantly, he also ﬁnds that the impact is likely to be consider-
ably larger when the nominal interest rate is at the zero lower bound.
IN THE FINAL PAPER, Carmen Reinhart and Vincent Reinhart reexamine
the macroeconomic policy lessons from the last previous episode of a
large, synchronized global downturn: the Great Depression. That eco-
nomic slump, like the current one, led policymakers to implement uncon-
ventional monetary policy, which for many countries took the form of
abandoning the gold standard. The favored interpretation among economic
historians has been that this step, by changing expectations and permitting
monetary expansion and currency depreciation, was critical to recovery.
The key piece of evidence for this interpretation is the ﬁnding among a
small group of industrialized countries of a quantitatively large and highly
statistically signiﬁcant correlation between how quickly countries left the
gold standard and the severity of their depressions: countries that left
sooner tended to fare better. Reinhart and Reinhart challenge this ﬁnding
by showing that it is not robust. In particular, expanding the sample to
include developing countries and a few others reduces the estimated effect
and renders it insigniﬁcantly different from zero. The relationship is even
weaker when alternative measures of output behavior are considered. This
provocative ﬁnding raises the question as to why the strong relationship
between exit and recovery disappears in the broader sample. The authors
argue that one would not expect leaving gold to be enough to blunt a severe
downturn, and they point out that many countries—including some that
left gold early—did not experience substantial depreciations of their curren-
cies against the U.S. dollar.
Turning to ﬁscal policy, Reinhart and Reinhart present two main ﬁnd-
ings. First, ﬁscal policy during the Depression was procyclical or acyclical
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cyclical, the stimulus was erratic, so that any potential beneﬁts might have
been negated by uncertainty on the part of private agents about future pol-
icy. This uneven history makes the Great Depression a poor laboratory for
testing the potential value of strong, steady ﬁscal stimulus in the face of a
major worldwide downturn.
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